Insurance Agents Can't Compete Against Former Brokerage

In Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld an interlocutory injunction that prevented two insurance agents from soliciting customers and employees from their former employer.


Enforceability of Non-Competition Agreements

In cases in which an employer asks the court to stop a former employee from competing, the key issue is usually the legal validity of the non-compete clause in the employment contract.  Since a non-compete clause restrains trade and can prevent the former employee from earning a living, courts often declare them unenforceable on public policy grounds.


The law does recognize that there are circumstances, however, in which a non-competition agreement is needed to protect the employer's interests, such as when the employee has gained access to trade secrets and developed relationships with long-term customers in the course of employment.  Seeking to strike a balance between the interests of the employee and the employer, the courts scrutinize non-competition clauses carefully, upholding them only when they are reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests.

This analysis normally focusses on the geographic and temporal scope of the non-compete.  If the clause would prevent the employee from working in areas where he was not engaged by the employer, or seeks to keep the employee out of the market for a lengthy period of time, it can be struck down.






In the Renfrew Insurance case, insurance agents Cortese and Reed each signed a Unanimous Shareholder Agreement (the "USA") in order to become part owners in the broker, Renfrew.  The USA contained a restrictive covenant that prevented them from competing in the insurance business within 60 km of Renfrew's Calgary office for 6 months after the termination of employment.  The covenant also stated that they would not solicit any of Renfrew's customers or employees for 18 months.






In January of 2014, both agents took jobs with one of Renfrew's competitors, BFL Insurance Services ("BFL").  They immediately started to work out of BFL's Calgary office, claiming however that they were servicing customers in Edmonton, Canmore, and elsewhere in Alberta and not within the 60 km radius prohibited by the covenant.  Two Renfrew customer service representatives who had previously worked with Cortes and Reed joined BFL.  Furthermore, at least two former Renfrew clients switched to BFL, although these clients were being served by another BFL agent and not by Cortese or Reed.






Test for Injunctive Relief




In order to obtain a pre-trial injunction enforcing a non-compete clause, the employer has to pass a three part test:






1.     Is there a strong case that the clause is legally valid, and that the employee is in breach?






2.     Will the employer suffer "irreparable harm", meaning losses that can't be adequately compensated by an award of monetary damages, if the employee is allowed to compete until trial?






3.     Does the balance of convenience between the employee and the employer favour the injunction?






The judge who heard the original application concluded that the covenant against competition was reasonable in scope.  In reaching this conclusion, he took note of the fact that the clause appeared in a shareholders' agreement rather than in an employment contract, so the contract was more like a commercial transaction between partners in a business than a conventional employer-employee relationship.  He also concluded that the agents were not pressured to sign the USA, that signing was not a condition for their continued employment, and that they had independent legal advice.






The application judge held that the restriction on soliciting Renfrew customers was reasonable, having regard to the importance of the "book of business" in an insurance brokerage business.  It was also significant that the two agents had built their "niche" in the business with Renfrew's assistance.






Given that two other Renfrew employees had left to join BFL, and that two customers had switched brokers, the application judge was prepared to infer that the agents were in breach and that the threat to the Renfrew business was serious enough to constitute irreparable harm.






The restrictive covenants in this case specified that damages would not be an adequate remedy, and this was another factor that favoured the injunction.






Standard of Review on Appeal




In granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, the application judge is exercising judicial discretion.  An appellate court will defer to the judge below unless he decided the case arbitrarily or applied wrong legal principles.  The interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law, reviewable on a standard of correctness, but where factual findings are needed in order to apply the clause, the findings of the judge should be upheld in the absence of palpable and overriding error.






In other words, in this kind of case, the Court of Appeal will uphold the decision of the application judge unless it is clearly wrong.  The Appellate Court felt that intervention was not justified, and dismissed the employees' appeal.




Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, 2014 ABCA 203

Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.



Would You Insure This House?

    Unfit for Human Occupation

Anyone who has applied for insurance on a house or commercial building knows that the insurance agent will want to complete a questionnaire disclosing detailed information about the condition of the building.  If the insured gives false information, the insurer can revoke coverage for misrepresentation.  A lot of people are probably unaware that they have an ongoing legal obligation to inform their insurance company of any significant change in the condition of the insured property, and that the insurer can deny a claim because of failure to report a "material change in the risk".

 

The source of this obligation is a statutory condition that is incorporated into most property insurance policies in Canada: "The insured must promptly give notice in writing to the insurer or its agent of a change that is material to the risk and within the control and knowledge of the insured."  Matters that might be considered material include changes in use or occupation, major renovations, or alterations to electrical, heating, alarms, or other important building systems.

 

Insurance underwriters often dispatch an inspector to look at the home or building before issuing the policy.  The inspector may or may not have any particular qualifications in engineering or construction.  The fee paid for the inspection is small, and the inspections are often cursory.  With home insurance policies, the inspector generally does not enter the house, and the review carried out is often referred to as a "drive-by" inspection as the inspector does little more than visit the location to confirm that there is a building with no obvious pre-existing damage.

 

What happens if the inspector is in a position to note a condition about the building that is material to the risk, but that the insured has not disclosed to the insurance company? The insured could argue that the insurance company had knowledge of the state of the building, so the statutory condition doesn't apply.  The same argument might be raised in the face of a misrepresentation defence.

From the insurance company point of view, the inspection is for a very limited purpose and is not intended to confirm every detail in the insurance application.  Carrying out a thorough inspection would increase underwriting costs, which would have to be passed on to the insured through higher premiums.  The insured is in the best position to provide information about the property, and insurers should be able to rely on information in the insurance application without further inquiry.

 

In Mah v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, however, a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal was prepared to impute the knowledge of the inspector to the insurance company.

 

The insured bought a run-down house from his brother.  The house had been insured by Wawanesa, and the brokerage representing Wawanesa took an application from the new owner and agreed to bind coverage pending acceptance of the application by the insurer.

 

The insurance company knew that the building was unoccupied.  Between the date of the new owner's application and the date the policy was issued, however, an official with the regional health authority attended at the property and posted a notice on the rear door stating that the house was unfit for human occupation.  The notice was on bright orange paper, and the trial judge concluded that the owner must have seen it when he came by the house to cut the grass and take away the trash.  The owner did not report the health department's order to the insurer.

 

The insurer asked the broker to check on the type of heating system and age of the house, and to provide a photo "to confirm the dwelling's continued existence".  The broker sent a retired surveyor to conduct an inspection.  For $100, the surveyor attended at the property, carried out a "walk-around inspection", and took several pictures.  He did not enter the building.  He submitted his photos to the broker, along with a one-page handwritten report describing what he had seen.  The broker passed this note and the photos on to  Wawanesa's underwriting department.  One of the photos showed the back door; the orange notice was visible, but the print was not readable.

 

Wawanesa issued the policy, but denied coverage when the property was damaged by fire, citing the failure of the insured to report the health authority's order declaring the house unfit.  The surveyor was not called to testify at trial, so it is not known whether he actually read the health department notice or not.  The trial judge dismissed the action, and the insured appealed.

The fact that the insurance company did not have actual knowledge of the health department order was not in dispute.  The case turned on what the surveyor knew, and whether or not that knowledge could be attributed to the insurer.

The reasons of the trial judge were a little vague regarding the state of mind of the surveyor.  The judge said that "one could assume" that the surveyor saw the health department notice, then took note of the fact that he did not testify.  This suggests that the judge drew an adverse inference from Wawanesa's failure to call the surveyor.  The judge had concluded that the owner must have seen the notice on one of his visits to the property.  The majority in the Court of Appeal said that on the same basis, the judge's assumption about the surveyor's knowledge amounted to a fact finding that the surveyor saw the notice too.

According to the majority, the surveyor was an agent of the broker, and since the broker was an agent of the insurer, the surveyor was "the insurer's agent's agent".  In law, the surveyor's knowledge was the broker's knowledge, and the knowledge of the broker must be imputed to its principal Wawanesa.

In addition, the statutory condition requires notice to the insurer "or its agent".  In the view of the majority, the notice need not come from the insured, and the health authority was actually a better source of information about the fitness of the building.  Since the surveyor/agent had notice, the condition was satisfied and the insurer could not avoid coverage.

Justice O'Ferrall, in his dissent, did not take issue with the idea that the surveyor's knowledge could be imputed to the insurer, or that notice to the surveyor would satisfy the statutory condition.  He did not accept that the trial judge had drawn a factual inference regarding the surveyor's knowledge, and felt that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the surveyor must have seen the health department order.

For homeowner's policies, the costs involved in carrying out a detailed inspection cannot be justified as a routine part of the underwriting process.  Nevertheless, it appears that anything visible from outside the home will be considered within the knowledge of an insurer who orders a "drive-by" inspection prior to issuing a policy.  Certainly, any plaintiff's lawyer faced with a misrepresentation or non-disclosure defence will want to obtain production of the insurer's inspection report.

Mah v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2013 ABCA 363


Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

(403) 930-4106

RHayles@BillingtonBarristers.com

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

No Juries For Insurance Misrepresentation Cases

     Does trial by jury lead to chaos in the courtroom?

In a decision released Friday, the Alberta Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff's application for a jury trial in a life insurance claim: Coulter v. Co-operators Life Insurance Company.  The two Justices in the majority agreed that the insurer's misrepresentation defence was a claim for equitable relief which cannot be tried by a jury.  The dissenting Justice, who characterized the misrepresentation defence as statutory rather than equitable, would have permitted a jury trial.

The Misrepresentation Defence

 

The life insured was a long-time policyholder with Co-operators who applied for additional coverage less than two years before his death.  After investigating the claim, Co-operators paid the benefit on the original policy, but denied the additional benefit, taking the position that it was entitled to void this coverage as the life insured had misrepresented important facts on the recent application.  Co-operators relied on ss. 652 and 653 of the Alberta Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3, which state that misrepresentation of a material fact in the life insurance application renders the coverage voidable by the insurer within the first two years after coverage takes effect.

 

The Alberta statutory provisions are derived from uniform life insurance legislation, and similar provisions are in effect in all the common law provinces and territories of Canada.

 

When the beneficiary sued, Co-operators raised the misrepresentation issue in its statement of defence, citing the Insurance Act provisions.  The defendant was content to defend on this issue, and did not counterclaim for rescission of the insurance contract.  The beneficiary applied for a jury trial, but this application was denied by the Chambers Judge, who directed that the trial should proceed by judge alone.

The Majority Decision
 

In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Cote referred to the historical distinction between the common law courts and courts of equity.  In civil cases, the common law courts could award damages for breach of contract and other legal wrongs.  A broader range of remedies was available in the equity courts, including specific performance and declaratory relief.  Jury trials were available in the common law courts, but not in the courts of equity, where cases were decided only by judges.

 

Although the two courts are now joined into one, the distinction between common law and equity remains, and juries are not permitted in cases in which equitable relief is claimed.

 

There was no dispute that the plaintiff was claiming damages for breach of the insurance contract, and that this was a common law claim.  According to Mr. Justice Cote, however, the defence raised by Co-operators was essentially a claim for rescission of contract.  This was an equitable remedy, and since common law courts are restricted to damages, a jury could not decide the misrepresentation question.  The Chambers Judge was therefore correct in denying the application for a jury trial.

 

Justice Cote was careful to point out that although the reasons for denying the plaintiff a jury trial may seem to be based on a technical historical distinction, there are sound policy reasons for restricting equitable relief to judges.  Equitable remedies are discretionary.  In exercising their discretion judges are guided by previous cases, and by principles established in maxims such as "Delay defeats equities", and "He who seeks equity must do equity".  In the view of Mr. Justice Cote, the distinction between the principled exercise of a discretion and "mere sympathy or fairness" would be "almost impossible" to explain to a jury.  These cases are therefore unsuited to trial by jury.

 

In a claim for breach of contract or tort, on the other hand, the judge instructs the jurors that they must award damages if they conclude that the evidence supports certain findings of fact; there is no discretion involved.

The Dissent

 

In his dissenting judgment, Mr. Justice O'Ferrall seemed to accept that equitable claims involving the exercise of discretion are unsuited to trial by jury; in his view, however, the insurance company was not claiming equitable relief at all.

 

"Rescission" was not specifically pleaded.  In its statement of defence, Co-operators said that it was entitled to "void the policy" by virtue of the Insurance Act provisions.  This was a statutory defence rather than an equitable claim, and "What the jury would be asked to do in this case is determine whether or not the insured ... made a misrepresentation with respect to a fact or facts material to the insurance."  In his opinion, this was the kind of factual question that juries are especially well qualified to decide.  There is a presumption in favour of the right to trial by jury, which should be respected.

 

For the majority, however, Mr. Justice Cote pointed out that the Insurance Act provisions did not purport to displace the role of equity or replace the equitable remedy of rescission of contract.  The statute did not provide a comprehensive code for misrepresentation cases, such that it could be concluded that the legislature intended to occupy "the whole field" and do away with the role formerly carried out by courts of equity.

A View From the Bleachers

 

Justice Cote is right to prefer a principled or policy-based approach over reliance on the historical accident of the division between equitable and common law courts.  Where legal issues are more important to the case than factual issues, judges have an extensive knowledge of the law that jurors lack.  Jurors, on the other hand, are just as qualified as judges to decide whether or not a witness is lying, or to assess evidence and make findings of fact.

The jury is an important institution in our society.  Justice is delivered by members of the community who can bring a diversity of background and experience to the courtroom, rather than by a judicial "expert" with extensive, but perhaps narrow, training in one area (the law).  The jury introduces a populist, democratic element into our system of justice.  Trial by jury is a long-standing right that should only be taken away for cogent reasons.

It is conventional wisdom that an insurance company never wants to face a jury.  The man in the street will always be blinded by sympathy and emotion, it is thought, and will side with the individual plaintiff over the big, impersonal corporation every time.

This is not necessarily the case.  Several years ago, defence-side insurance lawyers in Ontario began to serve jury notices routinely in personal injury cases, believing that their clients would be better served by the practical, common-sense approach of jurors.  Whether to seek a jury trial is a question that both plaintiff and defence counsel should ask themselves in every case; it is a strategic decision that depends on more than just the sympathy factor.  A precedent that denies the life insurance beneficiary her claim to a jury trial cuts both ways, as insurers will not be able to put their defences to juries in future cases.

What about the Coulter case? Although it is easy to see how the discretionary aspects of certain equitable remedies, such as injunctions and specific performance, might be difficult for jurors without any legal training, it is unclear how equitable principles or maxims could come up in a misrepresentation case.  The issue is whether or not the insured misrepresented important facts on the application.  This is something a jury can decide.  Since the conduct of the insurance company is not in issue, maxims like "He who seeks equity must do equity" or "He who comes to equity must come with clean hands" don't have any bearing.  Delay is not a factor, as the insurer can only raise non-fraudulent misrepresentation within the two year incontestability period established by the insurance legislation.

 

The availability of jury trials in misrepresentation cases should be based on a pragmatic assessment of the real issues in the case, and not on the somewhat arbitrary fact that "rescission" of contract is historically a remedy granted by courts of equity.

 

Coulter v. Co-operators Life Insurance Company, 2013 ABCA 295

 

Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

(403) 930-4106

RHayles@BillingtonBarristers.com

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn



Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Insurance for Flood Damage to Your Home

    Pumping flood water back into the river

Standard homeowner's policies issued by Canadian insurance companies contain an exclusion for damage caused by flood.  Here is a typical flood damage exclusion:

"This policy does not insure … loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by flood, and the word "flood" means waves, tides, tidal waves, and the rising of, the breaking out or the overflow of, any body of water, whether natural or man-made…"

The exclusion clause is carefully drafted so as to provide the insurance company with the widest possible protection against this type of claim.

The language employed is quite comprehensive.  Damage arising "directly or indirectly" from flood is excluded from coverage, and the word "flood" is defined broadly so as to include things that people would not normally think of as flooding, such as tides and waves.  Flooding from any body of water, including man-made sources such as reservoirs, is excluded.

Courts in a number of Canadian provinces have upheld this form of exclusion clause.  In Catalano v. Canadian Northern Shield Insurance Company, 2000 BCCA 133, municipal workers diverted water from overflowing culverts so that it inundated the plaintiff's business.  The B.C. Court of Appeal held that the diversion was not a separate intervening cause of the damage, and that since the original source of the water was overflow arising from heavy rainfall and melting snow pack, the loss came within the policy definition of "flood" and was excluded.

In the recent emergency in Alberta, work crews in certain locations have erected berms and other barriers to divert overflow from rivers.  Although these actions are intended to protect residential areas from flooding, some property owners have probably found that the diverted water increased the flow over their land.  Assuming that the Alberta courts adopt the B.C. interpretation, the ensuing flood damage would be excluded under the typical home insurance policy.

In an Alberta case, the Court of Queen's Bench also accepted the insurer's interpretation of this clause.  In MacNichol v. Insurance Unlimited (Calgary) Ltd., 1992 CanLII 6185 rising water in the Peace River breached a dam, causing blocks of ice to go over the dam and crash into a pump-house that was under construction.  Although the immediate cause of the damage to the pump-house was the action of the ice blocks pounding against it, the court concluded that the direct cause was the rise and overflow of the river, which triggered the exclusion clause.

In another B.C. case, however, the Court of Appeal adopted an interpretation more favourable to the insured.  In B.C. Ferry Corp. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. (1987), 40 D.L.R.(4th)  766, the insured owned a ferry terminal which was damaged by heavy waves during a severe storm.  Since the evidence showed no abnormal rise in the water levels, however, the appellate court concluded that the event did not come within the extended definition of "flood" in the policy, which encompasses waves, tides, and tidal waves.  Although it was wave action that damaged the terminal, there was no rising of, breaking out, or overflow of any  body of water - the flood exclusion did not apply.

Although the Insurance Bureau of Canada has said that there is no coverage for "overland flooding" in Canadian home insurance policies, there is an alternative point of view.  If the original source of the water is overflow from a river, the damage comes within the standard flood exclusion and is not covered.  The exclusion does not use the word "overland", however, so the wording does not extend to any water that enters a home from outside regardless of the source.

There has been heavy rainfall in many areas of the province over the last week, and water that seeps or leaks into a home due to excess precipitation, and that does not originate in an overflowing river, stream, or reservoir, would not trigger the flood exclusion.  Such water damage would come within the coverage provided in an "all risks" policy, and would likely be covered as "storm" damage in a specified perils policy.

Here are some other kinds of losses that might be covered, even if the home policy contains a standard flood exclusion:

• Sewer backup - many home insurers provide sewer backup coverage as an add on for an extra premium.  If your home policy has a sewer backup endorsement, you are covered where waste water from storm or sanitary sewers has entered the basement through floor drains, tubs, shower stalls, or toilets.  You may also have coverage where some of the water entering your home is backup from sewers and some is overland flow from river flooding.
• Electrical disruption - electrical failure or interruption that is not caused by flood damage could be covered.  It seems that municipal authorities decided to cut power to certain areas once an evacuation order had been issued.  The spoiled contents of a fridge or freezer could be covered in this situation.  If the power loss was due to flood damage to a transformer, however, it would likely come within the flood exclusion.  The contrary argument is that the authorities cut power as a precautionary measure in areas that might be flooded, so the power disruption is analogous to the water diversion in the Catalano case.
• Evacuation costs - if you were evacuated, but your property was not in fact flooded, it is arguable that your accommodation costs such as hotel, restaurants, and parking could be covered.  Such losses would likely not be covered under a specified perils policy, but they should fall within the coverage of an all risks policy in the absence of an exclusion for government orders or actions.  Losses due to electrical disruption could be covered under the same argument.
• Theft, vandalism, arson - whether your property was flooded or not, damage caused by third parties while you were ordered to evacuate and unable to protect your home should be covered.
• Vehicle damage - cars are insured separately, and flood damage to a vehicle should be paid if the insured purchased comprehensive coverage.

All of the above applies to insurance for residential premises.  Business insurance is in an entirely different category.

Although standard business policies contain a flood exclusion similar to the one in home policies, business owners can purchase flood coverage for an extra premium.  This option is not available to home owners.

Even if a business policy does not have a flood endorsement, the flood exclusion often contains language stating that the exclusion does not apply to "resulting damage".  Under this exclusion to the exclusion, direct flood damage is not covered, but if building systems such as fire alarm and suppression, refrigeration, or security are damaged by flood waters, and then there is additional damage caused by the failure of one of those systems, this is "resulting damage" and it is covered.  An example might be the loss of the contents of an industrial freezer to spoilage where water shorts out electrical systems, causing the freezer to shut down.

If you are a business owner you should look at the specific terms of your policy and consult your broker, public adjuster, or legal counsel for assistance in determining what is and is not covered.

Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

(403) 930-4106

RHayles@BillingtonBarristers.com

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com/index.php?id=59

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

How To Make a Home or Business Insurance Claim

    Bow River Near Prince's Island, June 21, 2013

Early yesterday morning my wife and I were evacuated from our home along with thousands of other Calgary residents. My office is closed after the City issued an order for the controlled evacuation of the downtown area.

Although people living near the Elbow River are starting to return home this morning, it looks like the evacuation order for areas along the Bow River will remain in place for the time being. Power may not be restored in downtown for a few days, so many offices and businesses will remain closed.

Watching Global TV yesterday we saw incredible scenes of devastation, with many residential streets  covered in water. There was muddy water flowing around numerous warehouses and commercial buildings, as well as trucks and other vehicles half submerged.

Thousands of Alberta homeowners and tenants will be looking to their insurers to cover the damage to their houses, gardens, and possessions. Many business owners will have claims for property damage and business interruption. Insurance company claims departments will be inundated with new claims, and it will be difficult for people to get answers to their questions about what is covered, how to document a claim, and how much (if anything) the insurance company will pay.

The most important thing right now is to give your insurer written notice of your claim right away. Delay in giving notice won't just delay the resolution of your claim; it can provide grounds to deny the claim altogether. The insurance company has the right to inspect the damage as soon as possible (even if it doesn't have enough adjusters available to handle all the claims right now).

Send your notice by fax or email, as these methods provide a record of the date and time notice was received.

The initial notice should be short and sweet. You don't need to provide any details about what happened or what was damaged - that can come later. All you need to do is provide the name of the insured, the policy number, and the address of the insured premises. For date of loss, you should say "June 21, 2013 and continuing", as the damage may be ongoing.

Avoid using terms like "flood" or "water damage", as flooding from water sources outside the building is excluded from many policies. At this point, all you need to do is provide notice of a "loss" or "property damage" at the insured address.

If you know that your property is in an affected area but you can't inspect the damage because an evacuation order is still in place, you should send notice of claim anyway. It is very important to provide notice as soon as possible, and you don't need to state any details or estimate the amount of your claim yet.

The Insurance Bureau of Canada has stated publicly that there is no insurance coverage for "overland flooding" in Canada. This may or may not apply to your claim - coverage always depends on the wording of the policy, and insurance policies are subject to interpretation. Legal principles of interpretation generally favour the insured. You should not give up on a potentially substantial claim based on a general statement from an insurance industry organisation that may not apply to your policy and your situation.

Many policies do include coverage for back up from storm or sanitary sewers. If water entered your home from floor drains, showers, tubs, or toilets, at least part of the damage could be covered.

There may be other provisions in your policy that bring parts of the damage into coverage, even if your insurer is telling you it is excluded. You should still send the insurer notice of claim, photograph the damage thoroughly, and keep all your receipts.

Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

(403) 930-4106

RHayles@BillingtonBarristers.com

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com/index.php?id=59

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.