Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label appeal. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 June 2014

Insurance Agents Can't Compete Against Former Brokerage







In Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld an interlocutory injunction that prevented two insurance agents from soliciting customers and employees from their former employer.


Enforceability of Non-Competition Agreements


In cases in which an employer asks the court to stop a former employee from competing, the key issue is usually the legal validity of the non-compete clause in the employment contract.  Since a non-compete clause restrains trade and can prevent the former employee from earning a living, courts often declare them unenforceable on public policy grounds.


The law does recognize that there are circumstances, however, in which a non-competition agreement is needed to protect the employer's interests, such as when the employee has gained access to trade secrets and developed relationships with long-term customers in the course of employment.  Seeking to strike a balance between the interests of the employee and the employer, the courts scrutinize non-competition clauses carefully, upholding them only when they are reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests.




This analysis normally focusses on the geographic and temporal scope of the non-compete.  If the clause would prevent the employee from working in areas where he was not engaged by the employer, or seeks to keep the employee out of the market for a lengthy period of time, it can be struck down.






In the Renfrew Insurance case, insurance agents Cortese and Reed each signed a Unanimous Shareholder Agreement (the "USA") in order to become part owners in the broker, Renfrew.  The USA contained a restrictive covenant that prevented them from competing in the insurance business within 60 km of Renfrew's Calgary office for 6 months after the termination of employment.  The covenant also stated that they would not solicit any of Renfrew's customers or employees for 18 months.






In January of 2014, both agents took jobs with one of Renfrew's competitors, BFL Insurance Services ("BFL").  They immediately started to work out of BFL's Calgary office, claiming however that they were servicing customers in Edmonton, Canmore, and elsewhere in Alberta and not within the 60 km radius prohibited by the covenant.  Two Renfrew customer service representatives who had previously worked with Cortes and Reed joined BFL.  Furthermore, at least two former Renfrew clients switched to BFL, although these clients were being served by another BFL agent and not by Cortese or Reed.






Test for Injunctive Relief




In order to obtain a pre-trial injunction enforcing a non-compete clause, the employer has to pass a three part test:






1.     Is there a strong case that the clause is legally valid, and that the employee is in breach?






2.     Will the employer suffer "irreparable harm", meaning losses that can't be adequately compensated by an award of monetary damages, if the employee is allowed to compete until trial?






3.     Does the balance of convenience between the employee and the employer favour the injunction?






The judge who heard the original application concluded that the covenant against competition was reasonable in scope.  In reaching this conclusion, he took note of the fact that the clause appeared in a shareholders' agreement rather than in an employment contract, so the contract was more like a commercial transaction between partners in a business than a conventional employer-employee relationship.  He also concluded that the agents were not pressured to sign the USA, that signing was not a condition for their continued employment, and that they had independent legal advice.






The application judge held that the restriction on soliciting Renfrew customers was reasonable, having regard to the importance of the "book of business" in an insurance brokerage business.  It was also significant that the two agents had built their "niche" in the business with Renfrew's assistance.






Given that two other Renfrew employees had left to join BFL, and that two customers had switched brokers, the application judge was prepared to infer that the agents were in breach and that the threat to the Renfrew business was serious enough to constitute irreparable harm.






The restrictive covenants in this case specified that damages would not be an adequate remedy, and this was another factor that favoured the injunction.






Standard of Review on Appeal




In granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, the application judge is exercising judicial discretion.  An appellate court will defer to the judge below unless he decided the case arbitrarily or applied wrong legal principles.  The interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law, reviewable on a standard of correctness, but where factual findings are needed in order to apply the clause, the findings of the judge should be upheld in the absence of palpable and overriding error.






In other words, in this kind of case, the Court of Appeal will uphold the decision of the application judge unless it is clearly wrong.  The Appellate Court felt that intervention was not justified, and dismissed the employees' appeal.




Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, 2014 ABCA 203






Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:

(403) 930-4106


Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn


Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.




Friday, 1 November 2013

Would You Insure This House?

    Unfit for Human Occupation

Anyone who has applied for insurance on a house or commercial building knows that the insurance agent will want to complete a questionnaire disclosing detailed information about the condition of the building.  If the insured gives false information, the insurer can revoke coverage for misrepresentation.  A lot of people are probably unaware that they have an ongoing legal obligation to inform their insurance company of any significant change in the condition of the insured property, and that the insurer can deny a claim because of failure to report a "material change in the risk".
 
The source of this obligation is a statutory condition that is incorporated into most property insurance policies in Canada: "The insured must promptly give notice in writing to the insurer or its agent of a change that is material to the risk and within the control and knowledge of the insured."  Matters that might be considered material include changes in use or occupation, major renovations, or alterations to electrical, heating, alarms, or other important building systems.
 
Insurance underwriters often dispatch an inspector to look at the home or building before issuing the policy.  The inspector may or may not have any particular qualifications in engineering or construction.  The fee paid for the inspection is small, and the inspections are often cursory.  With home insurance policies, the inspector generally does not enter the house, and the review carried out is often referred to as a "drive-by" inspection as the inspector does little more than visit the location to confirm that there is a building with no obvious pre-existing damage.
 
What happens if the inspector is in a position to note a condition about the building that is material to the risk, but that the insured has not disclosed to the insurance company? The insured could argue that the insurance company had knowledge of the state of the building, so the statutory condition doesn't apply.  The same argument might be raised in the face of a misrepresentation defence.

From the insurance company point of view, the inspection is for a very limited purpose and is not intended to confirm every detail in the insurance application.  Carrying out a thorough inspection would increase underwriting costs, which would have to be passed on to the insured through higher premiums.  The insured is in the best position to provide information about the property, and insurers should be able to rely on information in the insurance application without further inquiry.
 
In Mah v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, however, a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal was prepared to impute the knowledge of the inspector to the insurance company.
 
The insured bought a run-down house from his brother.  The house had been insured by Wawanesa, and the brokerage representing Wawanesa took an application from the new owner and agreed to bind coverage pending acceptance of the application by the insurer.
 
The insurance company knew that the building was unoccupied.  Between the date of the new owner's application and the date the policy was issued, however, an official with the regional health authority attended at the property and posted a notice on the rear door stating that the house was unfit for human occupation.  The notice was on bright orange paper, and the trial judge concluded that the owner must have seen it when he came by the house to cut the grass and take away the trash.  The owner did not report the health department's order to the insurer.
 
The insurer asked the broker to check on the type of heating system and age of the house, and to provide a photo "to confirm the dwelling's continued existence".  The broker sent a retired surveyor to conduct an inspection.  For $100, the surveyor attended at the property, carried out a "walk-around inspection", and took several pictures.  He did not enter the building.  He submitted his photos to the broker, along with a one-page handwritten report describing what he had seen.  The broker passed this note and the photos on to  Wawanesa's underwriting department.  One of the photos showed the back door; the orange notice was visible, but the print was not readable.
 
Wawanesa issued the policy, but denied coverage when the property was damaged by fire, citing the failure of the insured to report the health authority's order declaring the house unfit.  The surveyor was not called to testify at trial, so it is not known whether he actually read the health department notice or not.  The trial judge dismissed the action, and the insured appealed.

The fact that the insurance company did not have actual knowledge of the health department order was not in dispute.  The case turned on what the surveyor knew, and whether or not that knowledge could be attributed to the insurer.

The reasons of the trial judge were a little vague regarding the state of mind of the surveyor.  The judge said that "one could assume" that the surveyor saw the health department notice, then took note of the fact that he did not testify.  This suggests that the judge drew an adverse inference from Wawanesa's failure to call the surveyor.  The judge had concluded that the owner must have seen the notice on one of his visits to the property.  The majority in the Court of Appeal said that on the same basis, the judge's assumption about the surveyor's knowledge amounted to a fact finding that the surveyor saw the notice too.

According to the majority, the surveyor was an agent of the broker, and since the broker was an agent of the insurer, the surveyor was "the insurer's agent's agent".  In law, the surveyor's knowledge was the broker's knowledge, and the knowledge of the broker must be imputed to its principal Wawanesa.

In addition, the statutory condition requires notice to the insurer "or its agent".  In the view of the majority, the notice need not come from the insured, and the health authority was actually a better source of information about the fitness of the building.  Since the surveyor/agent had notice, the condition was satisfied and the insurer could not avoid coverage.

Justice O'Ferrall, in his dissent, did not take issue with the idea that the surveyor's knowledge could be imputed to the insurer, or that notice to the surveyor would satisfy the statutory condition.  He did not accept that the trial judge had drawn a factual inference regarding the surveyor's knowledge, and felt that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the surveyor must have seen the health department order.

For homeowner's policies, the costs involved in carrying out a detailed inspection cannot be justified as a routine part of the underwriting process.  Nevertheless, it appears that anything visible from outside the home will be considered within the knowledge of an insurer who orders a "drive-by" inspection prior to issuing a policy.  Certainly, any plaintiff's lawyer faced with a misrepresentation or non-disclosure defence will want to obtain production of the insurer's inspection report.

Mah v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2013 ABCA 363


Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn


Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

When Is a Settlement Not a Settlement?

     The Alberta Court of Appeal

Settlement agreements often contemplate formal documentation that is to be prepared and executed later, most commonly a release "in a form satisfactory to counsel".  What happens if the form of the release proposed by one party's lawyer is not acceptable to counsel for the opposing party? That was the issue in Tessier v. City of Edmonton, a recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
 
The Settlement Discussions
 
This was an expropriation case.  During a break in the hearing before the Alberta Land Compensation Board, counsel for the property owners telephoned the lawyer for the City and offered to settle for $650,000, plus an additional amount of money that had been agreed previously.  Legal and expert fees were to be subject to a later negotiation.  Counsel for the City called back a few minutes later and, upon receiving confirmation that the owners would sign a release, accepted this proposal.
 
These terms, including the provision for a release, were confirmed later that day in an email from the City's lawyer to counsel for the owners.  On resumption of the hearing the following day, the lawyer for the owners advised the Board that the dispute had been settled, and asked that the case be adjourned subject to the execution of final documents and the payment of funds.  Two days later, however, the owners' lawyer told the solicitor for the City that his clients did not want to proceed with the settlement.  Counsel for the City took the position that a settlement had been concluded and sent opposing counsel a draft release.  In a letter the following day, the City's lawyer enclosed cheques for the settlement funds, to be held in trust pending execution and return of the release and the filing of a discontinuance with the Board.
 
Decision of the Board
 
The City applied to the Board for a determination as to whether or not there was a settlement.  When the lawyer for the owners was called as a witness, he testified that there was a settlement that had to be "papered".  The release he received from opposing counsel was typical of those he had previously negotiated with the City, except it had no confidentiality provision.  The Board ruled that there was a binding settlement, and the owners appealed to the Court of Appeal.
 
Decision on Appeal
 
The Court stated that the issue on appeal involved questions of contract law outside the Board's specialized expertise, so the standard of review was correctness.
 
The owners argued that the City's acceptance of the $650,000 offer was conditional because it contained additional terms that were set out in the release and the letter imposing trust conditions.  This was a counteroffer, and there was no deal as the counteroffer was never accepted.
 
The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments.  A settlement is a contract, and the contract is formed when the parties agree on the essential terms.  Once there is an agreement on essential terms, one party can tender a release on trust or escrow conditions without rescinding the agreement.  Although in some cases there will be a dispute over the terms of the release or the escrow conditions, that didn't happen in this case as the owners disavowed the settlement before the draft release was delivered.  In this situation, proffering a release or imposing trust conditions could not amount to a counteroffer.
 
In this case, it seems that the Board and the Court of Appeal were both influenced by the fact that the owners tried to back out of the agreement before the draft release was tendered, and that the objections to the release appeared to be an attempt to justify this after the fact.
 
Settled Law on Settlements
 
What if there is a genuine dispute over the terms of the release? These documents can be lengthy and complex, and are often the subject of much back-and-forth negotiation between counsel for the parties.  If counsel cannot reach an agreement about the terms of the release, is the settlement dead? Or can the court approve a release that the parties will be required to sign?
 
This issue has been the subject of previous litigation.  In Tessier v. Edmonton, the Court of Appeal referred to Fieguth v. Acklands Ltd., a 1989 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  The principles are well-established in the case law:
 
(1)     The question of whether or not a case has been settled is to be resolved by the application of the rules of contract formation;
 
(2)     Once there is an agreement on essential terms, the settlement is a binding contract;
 
(3)     A settlement implies an obligation to furnish a release, and if an action is outstanding, a consent dismissal as well;
 
(4)     A proposal to discontinue an action, with nothing more, does not amount to an offer to settle the underlying claim, so a release is not implied and need not be provided;
 
(5)     Settlement includes an implied right to a simple release of the claim that is the subject of the litigation, but unusual or additional terms, such as indemnity provisions, are not implied and have to be specifically agreed;
 
(6)     Once the parties agree on terms of settlement a contract has been formed, and this stage must be distinguished from later actions directed towards the execution or implementation of the settlement contract, such as the payment of funds or the proffering of a release;
 
(7)     Once the essential terms are agreed, subsequent conduct relating to the payment of funds, imposition of escrow terms, or the exchange of concluding documents in draft form will not vitiate the settlement unless one party goes so far as to repudiate the settlement agreement by refusing to carry out its terms;
 
(8)     In order to amount to repudiation, the conduct must constitute an unequivocal refusal to perform the contract, the equivalent of frustration or rescission of the contract;
 
(9)     If counsel cannot agree on a release, either party can apply to the Court for an order enforcing the settlement, which would include an order approving the release;
 
(10)    If there is an actual repudiation, the opposing party has the option of accepting the repudiation, which voids the settlement.  The litigation would then proceed as if there never was a settlement agreement.
 
 
Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn


Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.


Tuesday, 10 September 2013

No Juries For Insurance Misrepresentation Cases

     Does trial by jury lead to chaos in the courtroom?

In a decision released Friday, the Alberta Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff's application for a jury trial in a life insurance claim: Coulter v. Co-operators Life Insurance Company.  The two Justices in the majority agreed that the insurer's misrepresentation defence was a claim for equitable relief which cannot be tried by a jury.  The dissenting Justice, who characterized the misrepresentation defence as statutory rather than equitable, would have permitted a jury trial.

The Misrepresentation Defence
 
The life insured was a long-time policyholder with Co-operators who applied for additional coverage less than two years before his death.  After investigating the claim, Co-operators paid the benefit on the original policy, but denied the additional benefit, taking the position that it was entitled to void this coverage as the life insured had misrepresented important facts on the recent application.  Co-operators relied on ss. 652 and 653 of the Alberta Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3, which state that misrepresentation of a material fact in the life insurance application renders the coverage voidable by the insurer within the first two years after coverage takes effect.
 
The Alberta statutory provisions are derived from uniform life insurance legislation, and similar provisions are in effect in all the common law provinces and territories of Canada.
 
When the beneficiary sued, Co-operators raised the misrepresentation issue in its statement of defence, citing the Insurance Act provisions.  The defendant was content to defend on this issue, and did not counterclaim for rescission of the insurance contract.  The beneficiary applied for a jury trial, but this application was denied by the Chambers Judge, who directed that the trial should proceed by judge alone.

The Majority Decision
 
In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Cote referred to the historical distinction between the common law courts and courts of equity.  In civil cases, the common law courts could award damages for breach of contract and other legal wrongs.  A broader range of remedies was available in the equity courts, including specific performance and declaratory relief.  Jury trials were available in the common law courts, but not in the courts of equity, where cases were decided only by judges.
 
Although the two courts are now joined into one, the distinction between common law and equity remains, and juries are not permitted in cases in which equitable relief is claimed.
 
There was no dispute that the plaintiff was claiming damages for breach of the insurance contract, and that this was a common law claim.  According to Mr. Justice Cote, however, the defence raised by Co-operators was essentially a claim for rescission of contract.  This was an equitable remedy, and since common law courts are restricted to damages, a jury could not decide the misrepresentation question.  The Chambers Judge was therefore correct in denying the application for a jury trial.
 
Justice Cote was careful to point out that although the reasons for denying the plaintiff a jury trial may seem to be based on a technical historical distinction, there are sound policy reasons for restricting equitable relief to judges.  Equitable remedies are discretionary.  In exercising their discretion judges are guided by previous cases, and by principles established in maxims such as "Delay defeats equities", and "He who seeks equity must do equity".  In the view of Mr. Justice Cote, the distinction between the principled exercise of a discretion and "mere sympathy or fairness" would be "almost impossible" to explain to a jury.  These cases are therefore unsuited to trial by jury.
 
In a claim for breach of contract or tort, on the other hand, the judge instructs the jurors that they must award damages if they conclude that the evidence supports certain findings of fact; there is no discretion involved.

The Dissent
 
In his dissenting judgment, Mr. Justice O'Ferrall seemed to accept that equitable claims involving the exercise of discretion are unsuited to trial by jury; in his view, however, the insurance company was not claiming equitable relief at all.
 
"Rescission" was not specifically pleaded.  In its statement of defence, Co-operators said that it was entitled to "void the policy" by virtue of the Insurance Act provisions.  This was a statutory defence rather than an equitable claim, and "What the jury would be asked to do in this case is determine whether or not the insured ... made a misrepresentation with respect to a fact or facts material to the insurance."  In his opinion, this was the kind of factual question that juries are especially well qualified to decide.  There is a presumption in favour of the right to trial by jury, which should be respected.
 
For the majority, however, Mr. Justice Cote pointed out that the Insurance Act provisions did not purport to displace the role of equity or replace the equitable remedy of rescission of contract.  The statute did not provide a comprehensive code for misrepresentation cases, such that it could be concluded that the legislature intended to occupy "the whole field" and do away with the role formerly carried out by courts of equity.

A View From the Bleachers
 
Justice Cote is right to prefer a principled or policy-based approach over reliance on the historical accident of the division between equitable and common law courts.  Where legal issues are more important to the case than factual issues, judges have an extensive knowledge of the law that jurors lack.  Jurors, on the other hand, are just as qualified as judges to decide whether or not a witness is lying, or to assess evidence and make findings of fact.

The jury is an important institution in our society.  Justice is delivered by members of the community who can bring a diversity of background and experience to the courtroom, rather than by a judicial "expert" with extensive, but perhaps narrow, training in one area (the law).  The jury introduces a populist, democratic element into our system of justice.  Trial by jury is a long-standing right that should only be taken away for cogent reasons.

It is conventional wisdom that an insurance company never wants to face a jury.  The man in the street will always be blinded by sympathy and emotion, it is thought, and will side with the individual plaintiff over the big, impersonal corporation every time.

This is not necessarily the case.  Several years ago, defence-side insurance lawyers in Ontario began to serve jury notices routinely in personal injury cases, believing that their clients would be better served by the practical, common-sense approach of jurors.  Whether to seek a jury trial is a question that both plaintiff and defence counsel should ask themselves in every case; it is a strategic decision that depends on more than just the sympathy factor.  A precedent that denies the life insurance beneficiary her claim to a jury trial cuts both ways, as insurers will not be able to put their defences to juries in future cases.

What about the Coulter case? Although it is easy to see how the discretionary aspects of certain equitable remedies, such as injunctions and specific performance, might be difficult for jurors without any legal training, it is unclear how equitable principles or maxims could come up in a misrepresentation case.  The issue is whether or not the insured misrepresented important facts on the application.  This is something a jury can decide.  Since the conduct of the insurance company is not in issue, maxims like "He who seeks equity must do equity" or "He who comes to equity must come with clean hands" don't have any bearing.  Delay is not a factor, as the insurer can only raise non-fraudulent misrepresentation within the two year incontestability period established by the insurance legislation.
 
The availability of jury trials in misrepresentation cases should be based on a pragmatic assessment of the real issues in the case, and not on the somewhat arbitrary fact that "rescission" of contract is historically a remedy granted by courts of equity.
 
Coulter v. Co-operators Life Insurance Company, 2013 ABCA 295
 
Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn


Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Thursday, 11 July 2013

Supreme Court: Disqualification Is Not the Only Remedy for Law Firm Conflict of Interest



    The Supreme Court of Canada

McKercher LLP is a substantial law firm in Saskatchewan.  The Canadian National Railway Company retained McKercher from time-to-time on a variety of matters, and as of late 2008, McKercher was representing CN on three files: a personal injury claim, a real estate acquisition, and a receivership.  In that same time frame McKercher accepted a retainer to act against CN in a class action claiming that CN had overcharged farmers in Western Canada for the transportation of grain.
 
McKercher did not inform CN that it planned to initiate the action on behalf of the class.  The law firm hastily terminated its existing CN retainers before serving CN with the statement of claim in the class action, claiming $1.75 billion.  This was the first notice that CN received that McKercher was acting in a class action against CN.  CN applied for an order removing McKercher as solicitor of record for the class action plaintiffs, claiming conflict of interest, and the motion judge granted the order.  This decision was reversed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.
 
A further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada raised two issues: (1) can a law firm act against a current client on a matter unrelated to the client's existing files? (2) if not, does the firm's conflict of interest result in automatic disqualification, or should alternative remedies be considered?

The "Bright Line Rule"
 
In a decision released July 5, the court found that McKercher was in a conflict position, invoking the "bright line rule" from its earlier decision in R. v. Neil, 2002 SCC 70, [2002] 3 SCR 631.  Under the bright line rule a law firm cannot represent clients adverse in interest without first obtaining the clients' consent, even if the two matters are unrelated.
 
In its ruling in the McKercher case, the Supreme Court emphasized certain important aspects of the bright line rule.  The rule is based on a fiduciary's duty of loyalty.  It assumes that conflict of interest is inherent and inescapable in certain situations.  For that reason the rule cannot be rebutted or attenuated.
 
The scope of the rule is limited, however.  It only applies where the immediate interests of the client are directly adverse in the two matters.  It applies only to the client's legal interests, as opposed to business or strategic interests, so the rule is not triggered where the firm accepts a retainer on an unrelated matter from a company that is a business competitor of another client.  It should not be raised as a tactic in an effort to disqualify the law firm when the client has no real concern that its interests will be adversely affected (the Court suggested that an institutional client would not be permitted to abuse the rule by retaining a single lawyer in one office of a national firm, expecting that this would disqualify all other lawyers with that firm from acting against the client).  It does not apply in circumstances where it is unreasonable for the client to expect that the firm will not act against it in unrelated matters.  For instance, it is accepted practice that lawyers who handle work for "professional litigants" such as governments, banks, and other large institutions may act against these clients in unrelated matters.
 
The decision of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin, who said that McKercher's concurrent representation of CN and the class action plaintiff "fell squarely within the scope of the bright line rule."  The legal interests of CN and the Western farmers who made up the class were adverse.  CN was not trying to abuse the rule, and it was reasonable for CN to expect that its lawyers would not act for plaintiffs that were suing CN for $1.75 billion.
 
McLachlin, C.J. went on to find that McKercher was in breach of other duties.  A law firm has a duty of commitment to its client's cause, and should not summarily drop a client in order to avoid a conflict of interest.  The firm also owes its client a duty of candour and is required to advise the client of any developing matters that could effect the retainer.  The failure to advise CN of its intention to act for the class action plaintiff constituted a breach of this duty of candour.

The Disqualification Remedy
 
Disqualification from acting in the pending litigation is the normal remedy when a law firm is in breach of the bright line rule, and this is the remedy that the motion judge had granted to CN.  The Court recognised that disqualification is not always appropriate, however, and sent the case back to the motion judge for a determination of the proper remedy.
 
The Courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of justice.  This includes an inherent jurisdiction to remove law firms as solicitors of record in pending litigation.  The factors that militate in favour of disqualification are: (1) the potential for the misuse of confidential information; (2) the risk of compromised or impaired representation; and (3) the need to uphold the integrity and reputation of the administration of justice.
 
McLachlin, C.J. was of the view that there was no potential for the disclosure or misuse of confidential client information in the instant case.  There was no prior or current retainer giving McKercher access to confidential information that would be directly relevant to the claim brought by the Western grain farmers.  The motion judge concluded that McKercher, by virtue of its involvement in previous CN litigation, had acquired a unique understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and attitudes of CN with respect to litigation, and that this general knowledge was confidential information.  The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, said that a general understanding of CN's litigation strengths and weaknesses did not constitute confidential information.  The Supreme Court seems to have accepted this view, as the Chief Justice concluded that there was no confidential information at risk.
 
Since McKercher's other CN retainers had been terminated, there was also no concern that McKercher would fail to provide CN with strong representation in the concurrent matters out of a desire to favour its new clients.  The only remaining concern, then, was whether or not allowing McKercher to continue to act for the class would damage the integrity and reputation of the administration of justice.
 
Where there is a need to protect confidential information, or a risk of impaired representation, Madame Justice McLachlin said that disqualification is generally the only suitable remedy.  In cases where the concern is the protection of the reputation of the justice system, disqualification may be required in order to send a message that the law firm's disloyal conduct is condemned by the courts; this is not, however, necessary in every case.
 
In cases involving the protection of the integrity of the judicial system, factors that may point in another direction include: (1) delay in bringing the motion for disqualification; (2) prejudice to the new client's ability to retain counsel of choice; (3) difficulty on the part of the new client in finding alternative counsel; and (4) the fact that the law firm acted in good faith, reasonably believing that acceptance of the new retainer did not breach the bright line rule or law society conflict regulations.  Since these issues were not before the motion judge, and there was no evidence on these points, and it was necessary to remit the remedy question to the lower court.

Up to now, lawyers might have thought that a finding of conflict of interest would automatically result in disqualification.  It is understandable that the Supreme Court would want to allow flexibility in the area of remedies; disqualification is a blunt instrument that cannot suit every case.  If a firm is disqualified, even early in litigation, new counsel will have to be retained and briefed.  This causes delay.  Some of the work that the former firm has done will have to be repeated by the new firm, and thousands of dollars in fees may be wasted and unrecoverable.  Although the Supreme Court ruling does not permit a litigant to use disqualification for purely tactical purposes, even when this is not the case disqualification constitutes a serious tactical disadvantage to the party that has to retain new counsel.  This party, the new client, has not done anything wrong, so there is always an element of unfairness when a litigant's counsel of choice is disqualified.

Although in principle remedial flexibility is a good idea, it is difficult to understand how it could be applicable in this case.  The fact that the bright line rule applies even when the two retainers are unrelated was established by the Court's decision in R. v. Neil in 2002, so it seems unlikely that the McKercher firm had a good faith belief that the new retainer fell outside the rule.  Certainly McKercher could not have been surprised when CN moved for disqualification.

In addition to the finding that McKercher was in conflict, there are also the findings that McKercher breached its duty of commitment by terminating the earlier retainers in order to get around conflict rules, and that the firm breached its duty of candour by failing to advise CN that it was putting together a massive class action against CN.  If the Court wants to send a firm message condemning this kind of conduct on the part of lawyers, this case would seem to support that message.  CN did not delay in bringing its motion, the class action litigation was then in an early stage, and the Western grain farmers ought to be able to find another Western firm that has the capacity to handle a large and complex class action lawsuit.

It seems improbable that any remedy but disqualification could be appropriate, but we will have to await the decision of the motion judge on the issue of remedy.
 
Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39
 
Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106



Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Thursday, 27 June 2013

Bank Wins Conspiracy Case

    The Court of Appeal of Alberta

In HSBC Bank Canada v. Fuss the Court of Appeal of Alberta upheld a conspiracy judgment against corporate directors.  The defendants had stripped a company of its assets and diverted its business to a new company they controlled in order to prevent the secured creditor from recovering on a loan.

Factual Background

Electronics Wholesale had an operating line of credit with HSBC Bank of Canada.  The line was secured by a General Security Agreement ("GSA") which provided that any money collected by the borrower was subject to a trust in favour of HSBC.

Cameron Kendrick was the sole director and shareholder of Electronics Wholesale.  David Fuss was a director of Ariza Technology Inc. and of Incredible Electronics Inc., two companies that were suppliers to Electronics Wholesale.  He was also director of a third corporation that became a 50% shareholder in Electronics Wholesale.  His wife, Rhonda Thuna, was then made a director of Electronics Wholesale.  She was also a director of Ariza and the company that owned half the shares in Electronics Wholesale.

Electronics Wholesale began to encounter business difficulties in 2003, but it still had sufficient assets and income to meet its obligations to HSBC.  Kendrick, Fuss, and Thuna created companies to take over the business of Electronics Wholesale.  One of their new companies was called Electronics Wholesale (Edmonton) Ltd. ("EWE").  They opened an account at the TD Bank in the EWE name, and all three were signing officers for that account.  All of the receivables coming to Electronics Wholesale, as well as the proceeds of the sale of that company's inventory, were deposited in the TD account.  They also incorporated a numbered company, which eventually took over the business operations of Electronics Wholesale, including its inventory, receivables, and staff.

In June of 2004 HSBC appointed a receiver and manager for Electronics Wholesale.  The company was petitioned into bankruptcy a month later, but the remaining assets were of little value and HSBC was unable to realize on its security.  In addition, Kendrick produced misleading financial information for Electronics Wholesale and destroyed the company's electronic records.

The Judgment at Trial

HSBC sued Kendrick, Fuss, Thuna, and the companies they controlled for conspiracy to prevent HSBC from recovering the debt owed by Electronics Wholesale.  The trial judge found that there was a conspiracy against the Bank and awarded damages of $1.7 million.  Fuss and Thuna appealed.  In a decision released June 25, 2013 the Court of Appeal of Alberta upheld the trial judgment.

The Decision on Appeal

The Memorandum of Judgment of the Court of Appeal contains a useful summary of the elements of the tort of "unlawful conduct" conspiracy, and a careful analysis of the factual and legal conclusions of the trial judge.

The only legal question in the case was the test for conspiracy by unlawful conduct.  Although the standard for appellate review on this issue is correctness, the parties agreed that the trial judge had stated the test correctly.

The appellants' critique of the trial judgment involved issues of mixed fact and law, as well as inferences that the trial judge had drawn from the facts.  On appeal, the findings of the trial judge on these kinds of issues are entitled to deference and will not be overturned unless the appellants can show "palpable and overriding error".

The elements of unlawful conduct conspiracy are:

(1)  An agreement to act in concert;

(2)  Unlawful conduct in furtherance of the agreement;

(3)  The unlawful conduct must be directed towards the plaintiff;

(4)  Knowledge that the conduct is likely to injure the plaintiff; and

(5)  The conspirators' conduct must actually cause injury to the plaintiff.

Agreement

The alleged conspirators must act in combination, or with a common design.  They must know the facts of the agreement and intend to participate in it.  Where direct evidence of the agreement is not available, the court can resort to circumstantial evidence.

Fuss and Thuna argued that in order to be participants in the conspiracy, they would have had to know about Kendrick's misstatements to HSBC and his destruction of corporate records.  The trial judge had found that they were not aware of these fraudulent activities.

The appellate court said that this argument misconceived the findings of the trial judge.  The agreement which supported the conspiracy finding was not based on fraud; it was based on a common design to divert the assets and business of Electronics Wholesale to the new companies.  Fuss and Kendrick had agreed to repay debt owed to Ariza in preference to payments due to the Bank.  Although Thuna was less active in the conspiracy, she knew that Electronics Wholesale was in trouble and that its business was transferred to EWE.  Her participation in the common design consisted in carrying out her husband's instructions while knowing that the effect would be to deprive HSBC of its security.

Unlawful Conduct

Unlawful conduct means actions that are legally wrong, but the conduct does not have to be actionable.  Highly competitive commercial activity that is not otherwise illegal does not qualify.

The trial judge found that Fuss and Thuna had breached their statutory fiduciary duties as directors.  As a director of Electronics Warehouse, Thuna had a duty to see to it that the company met its obligations to the bank.  The transfer of the company's assets with no legitimate business purpose and for inadequate consideration was against the interests of Electronics Warehouse, and also a breach of her duty to see to it that the company could meet its obligations.  The judge also said that Fuss breached his duty as a fiduciary of the numbered company by authorizing it to take over the assets of Electronics Warehouse, effectively appropriating trust property.

These conclusions on the fiduciary responsibilities of directors seem to imply that a director is obliged to ensure that the company carries on business in a responsible and ethical manner, and not just in a manner that promotes the company's business goals.  The Court of Appeal did not feel it was necessary to consider this interesting idea.  The assets of Electronics Warehouse were transferred, with the approval of the appellants, at less than fair market value.  This constituted a conversion of the property of Electronics Warehouse, which was unlawful conduct sufficient to meet this branch of the test for conspiracy.

Other Elements of the Conspiracy

The appellate court had little difficulty supporting the conclusions of the trial judge with respect to the remaining branches of the test for conspiracy.  The diversion of the receivables and other assets of Electronics Warehouse was a deliberate scheme to separate the assets of the business from the liabilities.  The appellants knew that their actions would prevent the Bank from recovering on its security, and HSBC suffered a substantial loss as a result.

Damages

The principal amount of the debt was about $670,000.  The trial judge added in interest, collection costs, insurance premiums, the receiver's charges, and legal fees as all of these amounts were to be added to the debt under the terms of the GSA.  This brought the total to $1.7 million.  The Court of Appeal supported this calculation of damages.

Conspiracy requires illegality, either as the goal of the conspiracy itself or in the means for carrying it out.  Hard-headed business tactics that do not involve illegality are not actionable.  Business people who have been harmed by corporate machinations often struggle to find the requisite "unlawful conduct" they require in order to succeed in an action for conspiracy.  If the Court of Appeal had upheld the views of the trial judge regarding the statutory duties of directors, it would expand the scope of the tort of conspiracy considerably; a ruling in the other direction would limit the scope of the tort.  As the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to deal with the question, it will have to be resolved in another case on a different set of facts.



Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Wednesday, 12 June 2013

Court Finds Fiduciary Relationship in Oil Sands Equipment Marketing Agreement



    Oil Sands Operations

Indutech Canada Limited manufactures pipe and other speciality steel products for Alberta's heavy oil industry.  Guy and Barry Gibbs marketed Indutech products for many years under two "Agency Agreements" which appointed the Gibbs and their companies as Indutech's exclusive sales force.  From 2000 to 2004 the Gibbs operated a competing manufacturing business, Cladtech Canada Limited, without Indutech's knowledge.

Indutech eventually learned about the operations of Cladtech and sued for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  The trial judge found in favour of Indutech, holding that the defendants were fiduciaries of Indutech and granting judgment for $2 million.  This award consisted of some $1 million in damages, including $150,000 in punitive damages, plus $1 million representing the profits that the defendants had made from competing with the plaintiff.

The defendants appealed from the finding that they were fiduciaries of Indutech, and from the damages awarded, particularly the order under which they were required to disgorge the profits earned from their enterprise in addition to compensatory and punitive damages.  In a recent decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conclusions of the trial judge on both fiduciary duty and the amount of the award.

The reasons of the Court of Appeal provide a useful explication of the law respecting fiduciary relationships, both under the three part test established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 and International Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574,  and under the more recently developed "ad hoc" analysis from Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261 (S.C.C.).

The case is also interesting for the use of the remedy of "disgorgement".  The trial judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to be paid any profits that the defendants earned as a result of their breach of fiduciary duty, in addition to the traditional compensatory damages available for breach of contract.  The Court of Appeal agreed.

Fiduciary Relationships - The Principled Approach
A fiduciary relationship is one involving trust, obligations of confidentiality, and a duty to act in the interests of or for the benefit of another.  A finding of fiduciary duty allows the court to protect the vulnerable when they have been taken advantage of by those in positions of trust.  Courts enforce fiduciary duties because honesty, fairness, and protecting the weak from the strong are important values in our legal system.
The concept of fiduciary duty can be at odds with values of individual autonomy and self-reliance that are also important in our system of law.  This conflict between competing values manifests itself in a reluctance on the part of our courts to impose fiduciary obligations in a commercial context.  The role of the fiduciary can seem out of place in the business world; it often appears to be inconsistent with the notion of freedom of contract and the emphasis that the common law places on free markets and the enforcement of bargains.
Historically, fiduciary obligations arose in certain established categories of relationships, such as agent and principal, solicitor and client, or trustee and beneficiary.  Since it is well understood that an agent has to protect confidential information, avoid conflicts of interest, and act for the benefit of the principal, anyone who agrees to act as an agent also agrees, either expressly or by implication, to take on the responsibilities of a fiduciary.
More recently, courts have recognized that the categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed.  It now appears that the categories that historically gave rise to fiduciary responsibilities are only instances in which a set of principles have been applied to identify fiduciary relationships.  This principled approach to fiduciary relationships, which originates in the dissenting opinion of Wilson, J. in Frame v. Smith, was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Corona Resources.  Under the Frame v. Smith analysis, relationships in which fiduciary obligations are imposed possess three characteristics: 
  1. The fiduciary is in a position to exercise discretion or power over the affairs of the beneficiary;
  2. The fiduciary can exercise that power unilaterally, so as to effect the beneficiary's interests;
  3. The beneficiary has a particular vulnerability to the fiduciary.
The defendants in Indutech argued that they were not agents as the agreements gave them no authority to bind Indutech.  Since the substance of the relationship prevails over the words used by the parties to describe it, the fact that the two contracts between Indutech and the defendants were labelled "Agency" agreements was not determinative.  This meant that the courts had to struggle with the issue of whether or not to find a fiduciary relationship between two business organizations dealing with each other at arm's length.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the terms of the agreements did give the defendants power and discretion, which resulted in a corresponding vulnerability on the part of Indutech.  The agreements made the defendants the exclusive sales force for Indutech.  The defendants were required to keep Indutech informed about the market and about sales opportunities.  The defendants were subject to a duty of loyalty and were restricted from dealing with Indutech's competitors.  They had unlimited access to Indutech's customers and sales data, including confidential information on pricing, timing, and market strategy.
Indutech gave the defendants confidential business information, treating the defendants' personnel as if they were Indutech employees.  This close relationship made Indutech vulnerable as it provided the defendants with the opportunity to divert sales, manipulate prices, and influence purchasing decisions by providing Indutech customers with false scheduling information.  Vulnerability by itself does not give rise to fiduciary duties, but where it arises out of the contractual relationship between the parties rather than from pre-existing causes outside the contract, a fiduciary relationship can be formed.
There is a line of authority supporting the proposition that the courts should hesitate to find a fiduciary relationship when two corporations motivated by profit enter into an arm's length transaction.  The court was at pains to distinguish these cases, stating that the principle is limited to a situation in which a business entity fails to take available steps to protect its interests, then turns around and complains that it was taken advantage of.  In the instant case, Indutech built protections into the terms of the agreements, but the defendants gained advantage through a series of calculated breaches of those contractual protections.
The Court of Appeal emphasized the fact that in the commercial context a fiduciary relationship has to be based on the terms of the contract and not on circumstances external to the contract.  As in the traditional categories of fiduciary relationships, the principled analysis requires an "undertaking" on the part of the fiduciary to take on duties of trust and confidence.  The court concluded that "Such a circumstance arises where, as here, the contract imposed express obligations of loyalty and non-competition."
The "ad hoc" Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation
The Court of Appeal also considered the applicability of the approach established in the Elder Advocates decision, in which a fiduciary relationship is founded on an "ad hoc" basis outside traditional categories.  The requirements for an ad hoc finding of fiduciary relationship were summarized by McLachlin, J. in Elder Advocates:
  1. Vulnerability arising from the relationship, as in Frame v. Smith;
  2. An undertaking by the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiary;
  3. A defined person or class that is subject to the fiduciary's control; and
  4. The fiduciary can adversely exercise discretion or control so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests.

The Court of Appeal decided to uphold the trial judge's decision as the facts that supported the existence of a fiduciary relationship under a Frame v. Smith analysis also supported an ad hoc finding of fiduciary obligation.  On the facts of the Indutech v. Gibbs case, the two approaches to the issue are very similar, and the Court of Appeal suggested that they may just be "different ways of stating the same thing".

The common thread that runs through the cases on fiduciary relationships is the vulnerability of the beneficiary and the "undertaking" or agreement of the putative fiduciary to do something that is associated with a fiduciary role.  Whether the approach is one of traditional categories of fiduciary relationship, the principled analysis from Frame v. Smith, or the ad hoc approach from Elder Advocates, the fiduciary has to agree to keep information in confidence, refrain from competition, safeguard another's property, give precedence to the beneficiary's interests, or otherwise undertake an obligation of loyalty and trust.  If the beneficiary is vulnerable to a breach of the undertaking, a fiduciary relationship is established.
Compensatory Damages and the Disgorgement Remedy
The normal measure of damages for breach of contract is an amount that would restore the income that the plaintiff lost as a result of the breach.  These are sometimes referred to as "compensatory" damages.  Where the defendant is in breach of a fiduciary obligation, the court can go further; in addition to awarding compensatory damages, it can order the defendant to disgorge any profits arising from the breach of duty.
The defendants had diverted sales and opportunities rightly belonging to Indutech in a number of different instances.  The fact that the defendants were in breach of their fiduciary obligations did not justify an across the board application of the disgorgement remedy.  Indutech had to establish, in each instance, that the defendants' profits result from breach of fiduciary duty and not merely from breach of contract.
As the trial judge had been careful to distinguish between activities that constituted breach of contract and those that amounted to breach of fiduciary duty, and limited the award to compensatory damages where no breach of fiduciary duty was involved, the Court of Appeal upheld her use of the disgorgement remedy.  The remedies for breach of fiduciary duty are discretionary, so the standard on appellate review is reasonableness.  Since the trial judge had not committed any error of law in applying the disgorgement remedy, the Court of Appeal was not prepared to interfere with the exercise of her discretion.
Punitive Damages
In cases involving breach of fiduciary duty, the court can award punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages; the purpose of the punitive damages is to deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct, and to uphold the integrity of fiduciary relationships.  In the Indutech case, the Court of Appeal stated that if a market is to operate smoothly and effectively, manufacturers have to be able to rely on their sales representatives to protect confidential information and trade secrets.
Punitive damages have to be proportionate.  In determining whether or not to award punitive damages, the court is to consider such factors as the harm caused, the degree of misconduct, the relative vulnerability of the plaintiff, and the advantage and profit accruing to the defendants.  The defendants argued that the addition of the disgorgement remedy amounted to sufficient deterrence, and that an award of exemplary damages was therefore disproportionate.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had exercised her discretion reasonably.  The $150,000 punitive damages award was proportionate to the balance of the award ($1.85 million), and amounted to appropriate deterrence in light of the long period of deliberate and flagrant breaches of contract and the dishonesty and deceit involved.





Indutech Canada Limited v Gibbs Pipe Distributors Ltd., 2013 ABCA 111
http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/jdb_new/public/ca/2003-NewTemplate/ca/Civil/2013/2013abca0111cor1.pdf


Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.